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Abstract: In a second-best optimal growth setup with only factor taxes as available instruments,
is it optimal to fully replace capital by labor income taxation? The answer is generally positive
based on Chamley, Judd, Lucas, and many follow-up studies. In the present paper, we revisit
this important tax reform-related issue by developing a human capital-based endogenous growth
framework with frictional labor search and matching. We allow each rm to create multiple vacancies
and each worker to determine labor market participation endogenously. We consider a benevolent
scal authority to nance direct transfers to households and unemployment compensation only by
factor taxes. We then conduct dynamic tax incidence exercises using a model calibrated to the U.S.
economy with a pre-existing 20% at tax on both the capital and labor income. Our numerical
results suggest that, due to a dominant channel via the interactions between the rms vacancy
creation and the workers market participation, it is optimal to switch partly by a modest margin
from capital to labor taxation in a benchmark economy where human capital formation depends
on both the physical and human capital stocks. When the human capital accumulation process is
independent of physical capital, the optimal tax mix features a slightly larger shift from capital to
labor taxation; when we remove the extensive margin of the labor-leisure trade-o¤, such a shift is
much larger. In either case, however, the optimal capital tax rate is far above zero.
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1 Introduction
Since the pivotal work by Chamley (1985a, 1985b, 1986) and Judd (1985, 1987), there has been
a large literature studying dynamic factor tax incidence in optimal growth models in order to
identify the optimal factor tax mix in a second-best world where full access to the lump-sum tax is
unavailable. Because labor is xed but capital can be accumulated over time, Chamley and Judd
recommended that the optimal at factor tax scheme be implemented to fully eliminate the tax on
the more elastic capital and to impose a tax only on the perfectly inelastic labor in the long run.
This Chamley-Judd proposition has been revisited and extended to various economic environments
and the general conclusion has largely been robust as long as the at factor tax rate setup and the
benevolent central planner assumption are maintained.
About two decades ago, the celebrated work by Lucas (1988) provided a compelling argument
that human capital is a primary engine of the endogenously determined economy-wide growth rate.
Because human capital augments labor, an immediate question arose: Would it be welfare-reducing
to tax labor in a human capital-based endogenous growth framework? Two years later, Lucas (1990)
himself addressed this question based on his dynamic factor tax incidence exercises and provided a
policy recommendation that neither physical nor human capital should be taxed and that only raw
labor should be taxed. His policy recommendation has not yet been challenged in a prototypical
setup with at factor tax rates and a benevolent central planner.
In this paper, we follow this convention by reexamining the validity of the Lucasian policy
recommendation in a generalized human capital-based endogenous growth economy with individuals
endogenously participating in the frictional labor market. It was well-documented in the labor search
literature pioneered by Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984) that informational and institutional
barriers to job search, employee recruiting, and vacancy creation were substantial. Such frictions
have been shown to generate important impacts on macroeconomic performance over the business
cycle (cf. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Merz 1995; Andolfatto 1996) as well as in the long run
(cf. Aghion and Howitt 1994; Laing, Palivos and Wang 1995; Chen, Chen and Wang 2011).1 It is
therefore natural to inquire whether such frictions may inuence individual decisions to generate
su¢ cient responsivenessin the long run to a tax on labor income such that labor taxation is too
distortionary to be used to fully replace capital taxation.
Our paper attempts to address this important issue that has practically valuable implications
for tax reform considerations. Specically, we construct a two-sector human capital-based endoge-
nous growth framework with labor market search and entry frictions in which the labor market
participation decision is endogenous. We assume that vacancy creation and maintenance as well as
job search are all costly and that unlled vacancies and active job seekers are brought together by a
1See Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005) for a comprehensive survey.
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matching technology exhibiting constant returns. We consider largerms and largehouseholds
where each rm creates and maintains multiple vacancies and each household contains a continuum
of members comprising employed and nonemployed workers. The wage rate (in e¢ ciency units) is
determined based on a cooperative bargain between the matched rm and household pair, satisfying
the Hosios (1990) rule of bargaining e¢ ciency. A benevolent scal authority nances direct trans-
fers to households and unemployment compensation only by way of taxing factor incomes. In the
benchmark setup, we consider a general two-sector framework as proposed by Bond, Wang and Yip
(1996) in which the accumulation of either physical or human capital is driven by both physical and
human capital stocks. We then consider another type of economy with a Lucasian human capital
accumulation process that is independent of physical capital. We further calibrate our economy to
t observations in the U.S. over the post-WWII period, with a pre-existing 20% at tax rate being
levied on both capital and labor income. This enables us to conduct dynamic factor tax incidence
exercises, and to draw policy recommendations based on a revenue-neutral welfare comparison of
factor taxes.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. We show that, under an e¢ ciency wage bargain,
both capital and labor taxes lower the bargained wage rate (in e¢ ciency units). However, these
factor taxes can generate very di¤erent e¤ects on the wage discount that measures how much our
equilibrium wage in the presence of labor market search and entry frictions is below the competitive
counterpart in a frictionless Walrasian setup. Specically, under an e¢ ciency wage bargain, if the
capital tax rate is initially too low, then a higher tax on capital income accompanied by a revenue-
neutral reduction in the labor tax turns out to raise the wage discount and to encourage rms to
create more vacancies. This in turn raises the job nding rate and hence induces workers to more
actively participate in the labor market to seek employment. Because this leads to positive e¤ects
on employment and output growth, a shift from a zero to a positive capital tax rate becomes welfare-
improving, thereby yielding a policy recommendation di¤erent from that of Chamley-Judd-Lucas.
By conducting factor tax incidence exercises in our calibrated economy, we nd that, in the
benchmark case with factor taxes at pre-existing rates of (20%; 20%), it is optimal to only partly
replace the capital tax by the labor tax: the optimal at tax rates on capital and labor income are
19:07% and 24:56%, respectively. Since the above-mentioned vacancy creation-labor participation
channel is quantitatively signicant, the optimal factor tax rates turn out to be close to their pre-
existing gures. As a consequence, such a reform only induces a modest 0:0128% welfare gain in
consumption equivalence. Upon various sensitivity and robustness checks, we nd that it is hardly
optimal to fully replace capital by labor taxation within all reasonable ranges of parameterization.
The conclusion remains even when the extensive margin of leisure is shut down and when the
human capital accumulation process is independent of physical capital. When the human capital
accumulation process is independent of physical capital, the optimal tax rates on capital and labor
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income become 17:87% and 30:70%, respectively, featuring a slightly larger shift from capital to labor
taxation. When we remove the extensive margin of the labor-leisure trade-o¤, such a shift is much
larger: the optimal tax rates on capital and labor income are now 9:15% and 68:79%, respectively.
The results suggest that while the vacancy creation-labor participation channel and the extensive
margin of the labor-leisure trade-o¤ are quantitatively crucial for dynamic factor tax incidence, the
form of human capital accumulation is not. Finally, in an economy with a Lucas (1988)-type human
capital accumulation process, independent of physical capital, or with a Walrasian frictionless labor
market, it is always optimal to fully eliminate capital taxation by taxing only labor income.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to the discrete-time, real-business-cycle (RBC) search literature pioneered
by Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996). In contrast with theirs, our model considers sustained
economic growth with endogenous human capital accumulation. Previously, Laing, Palivos and
Wang (1995) incorporated human capital-based endogenous growth into the Mortensen-Pissarides
search framework, whereas Chen, Chen and Wang (2011) introduced human capital growth into the
Andolfatto-Merz RBC search framework using a pseudo central planning setup. We follow the latter
strategy, allowing comprehensive labor-leisure-learning-search trade-o¤s as well as endogenous labor-
market participation. Di¤ering from their work, our paper performs dynamic factor tax incidence
analysis in a fully decentralized setup with a more general human capital accumulation process.
Over the past two decades, several studies have investigated the long-run growth e¤ects of factor
taxes, including King and Rebelo (1990), Stokey and Rebelo (1995), Bond, Wang and Yip (1996),
and Mino (1996), under perfectly competitive setups without externalities. This literature has been
extended to incorporate positive externalities, productive public capital or market imperfections,
such as Guo and Lansing (1999), Cassou and Lansing (2006) and Chen (2007). This strand of
the literature, however, focuses exclusively on long-run growth or welfare e¤ects of factor taxation
rather than on factor tax incidence.
The closely related literature was initiated by Lucas (1990) who reexamined the Chamley-
Judd proposition of dynamic factor tax incidence in a human capital-based endogenous growth
framework.2 His main conclusion was that the government should not tax either physical or human
capital but rather tax raw labor only. This Lucasian policy recommendation was reconrmed by
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) in which only investment goods enter physical and human capital
accumulation (i.e., there is no trade-o¤ between education time and work hours). Even in a more
general setup by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997) that allowed both investment goods and education
time to enter human capital accumulation, the Lucasian policy recommendation still remains valid
2There is a recent strand of the literature on optimal taxation which does not incorporate human capital, but
instead considers nonlinear labor taxation, alternative non-factor taxes, incentive problems and/or political economy.
Its focus is very di¤erent from ours.
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under constant-returns technologies in the absence of an alternative tax on consumption.
In a recent paper, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009) pointed out clearly that a call for taxing
capital may be due to borrowing constraints, uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, and/or life-cycle
settings where the tax code cannot be age-dependent. In their paper, these aforementioned features
as well as the progressiveness of labor income taxes are all allowed. Yet, in their calibrated model
M1 where borrowing constraints, idiosyncratic risk and progressive tax features are turned o¤, the
optimal factor tax mix is to levy 10% and 19% tax rates, respectively, on capital and labor income
(with consumption being taxed at 5%).3 The positive capital tax prescription in this simple setup
is purely a consequence of the life-cycle setting: assuming a period-by-period balanced government
budget, capital taxation serves to equate aggregate private asset demand with the societys capital
stock in the presence of life-cycle competitive ine¢ ciency. Capital income becomes essentially tax-
exempt when life-cycle competitive ine¢ ciency is largely mitigated by a nontrivial age-dependent
wage earning prole and a pay-as-you-go social security system. In our innite lifetime model,
such life-cycle competitive ine¢ ciency is absent. Yet, by incorporating endogenous human capital
accumulation together with endogenous participation in a frictional labor market, we still establish
that taxing capital is not a bad idea after allbased on very di¤erent underlying economic channels
from Conesa, Kitao and Krueger.
2 The Model
We consider a discrete-time model with a continuum of identical innitely-lived large rms (of
measure one), a continuum of identical innitely-lived large households (of measure one) and a
scal authority.
The adoption of the large household setup proposed by Lucas (1990) is to ease unnecessary
complexity involved in tracking the distribution of the employed and the unemployed, so as to
eliminate the possibility of an endogenous distribution of human and physical capital stocks as a
result of idiosyncratic search and matching risk in the frictional labor market. The large household
consists of a continuum of members (of measure one), who are either (i) employed, by engaging in
production, on-the-job learning, or leisure activity, or (ii) nonemployed, by engaging in job seeking
or leisure activity. We assume that households own both productive factors, capital and labor.
While the goods market is Walrasian and the capital market is perfect, the labor market exhibits
search and entry frictions. In particular, a rm can create and maintain (multiple) vacancies only
upon paying a vacancy creation and maintenance cost in the form of labor inputs. The households
(endogenously determined) labor market participation is also costly with a foregone earning cost.
3By allowing for endogenous learning-by-doing, Peterman (2010) obtains optimal capital and labor tax rates of
21% and 23%, respectively.
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Unlled vacancies and active job seekers are brought together through a Diamond (1982) type of
matching technology, where each vacancy can be lled by exactly one searching worker. In our
model, the ow matching rates (job nding and employee recruitment rates) are both endogenous,
depending on the masses of both matching parties. In every period, lled vacancies and employed
workers are separated at an exogenous rate.
The benevolent scal authoritys behavior is simple: it uses factor taxes to nance direct transfers
to households and unemployment compensation. The optimal factor tax mix is to maximize social
welfare by maintaining a periodically balanced budget.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated with a continuum of large households of mass one, each consisting of
a continuum of members of unit mass. A representative large household with a unied preference
pools all resources and enjoyment from its members. In period t, a fraction nt of the members are
employed and 1  nt are nonemployed. To simplify the analysis, let each member be endowed with
one unit of daytime and z unit of nighttime. While the night time is for leisure purposes, the
one unit of day time endowed by an employed member can be freely allocated to production (work
e¤ort, denoted `t) or to human capital investment (learning e¤ort, denoted 1   `t). By contrast,
the nonemployed allocates the entire time endowment 1 + z to leisure. The allocation of labor in
the day time is delineated in Figure 1. The unemployment rate is simply ut = 1   nt. In addition
to the labor endowment, households are assumed to own the entire stock of physical capital kt.
Since job matches are not instantaneous, the level of employment from the households perspec-
tive is given by the following birth-death process,
nt+1 = (1   )nt + t(1  nt) (1)
where  denotes the (exogenous) job separation rate and t is the (endogenous) job nding rate.
That is, the change in employment (nt+1 nt) is equal to the inow of workers into the employment
pool (t(1  nt)) net of the outow as a result of separation ( nt).
We consider a general human capital accumulation technology proposed by Bond, Wang and
Yip (1996) in which the production of incremental human capital requires both human and physical
capital inputs. Denote the fraction of physical capital devoted to goods production as st and that
to human capital accumulation as 1   st. The aggregate human capital of the household can thus
be accumulated via learning by the employed and inputs of the market good physical capital:
ht+1   ht = Dnt(1  `t)ht + eD[(1  st)kt] [nt(1  `t)ht]1  (2)
where h0 > 0 is exogenously given,  2 (0; 1) and D; eD > 0. When eD = 0 (and s = 1), human
capital accumulation is independent of market goods. This linear human capital evolution process
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resembles that proposed by Lucas (1988): it reduces to the Lucasian setup when nt = 1. Since
the accumulation of human capital depends on the employment rate nt, it gives the avor of on-
the-job learning. The above setup implies that the unemployed cannot accumulate human capital,
or, more generally, their human capital accumulation is completely o¤set by their human capital
depreciation.4 In general, eD > 0 and the accumulation of human capital requires inputs of market
goods. The functional form given above implies that physical capital is not necessary for human
capital accumulation as long as D > 0.
Denote the e¤ective wage and the capital rental rates by wt and rt , respectively, and the labor
and capital income tax rates by L and K , respectively. Let ct be household consumption and k be
the physical capital depreciation rate. In addition, denote the ratio of unemployment compensation
to the market wage by b and the per household lump-sum transfer from the government by Tt. The
household faces the following budget constraint:
kt+1 = (1  L)wtht

nt`t + (1  nt)b

+ [(1  k) + (1  K)rtst]kt   ct + Tt (3)
That is, the household allocates the total wage from employed members, total unemployment com-
pensations from unemployed members, total rentals from market capital devoted to production
(stkt) and total transfers to consumption and gross investment.
Let  > 0 be the subjective rate of time preference. The representative households preference
takes a standard time-additive form:

 =
1X
t=0

1
1 + 
t
~U (ct; nt)
The periodic utility function is given by ~U (ct; nt) = U (ct) +m1ntG(z1) +m2 (1  nt)G(z2), where
G is a function of individual leisure time z, taking a standard form with constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution  2 (0; 1): G(zi) = (zi)
1  1
1  1 (e.g., see Andolfatto 1995 and many others
in the macro labor literature). In this setup, what is emphasized is the extensive margin: the
unemployment takes more leisure than the employed. Recall that under our large household setting,
the employed devoted one unit of time to work and learning. To the unemployed, this one unit of
time becomes leisure. That is, z1 = z and z2 = 1 + z. In this way, the large households leisure is
endogenous purely due to the extensive margin related to endogenous labor participation. We can
rewrite the periodic utility function in a more convenient form:
~U (ct; nt) = U (ct) +m1ntG(z) +m2 (1  nt)G(1 + z)
= U (ct) +m2G(1 + z)  [m2G(1 + z) m1G(z)]nt
= constant+ U (ct) m (1  nt)
4See Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) and Laing, Palivos and Wang (2003) for a further discussion of the
human capital depreciation of displaced workers.
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where m  m2G(1 + z) m1G(z).
Let H = (k; h; n) denote the vector of current period state variables and H0 denote that of
the next period state variables. Then, the households optimization problem can be expressed in
Bellman equation form as:

(kt; ht; nt) = max
ct; `t; st
U (ct) m (1  nt) + 1
1 + 

(kt+1; ht+1; nt+1) (4)
subject to constraints (1), (2), and (3).
Dene conveniently e¤ective capital-labor ratios in the nonmarket and market sectors as qH =
(1  s)k
n(1  `)h and q
F =
sk
n`h
, respectively. The rst-order conditions with respect to ct, `t and st are
given by,5
Uc =
1
1 + 

k(H0) (5)

k(H0)(1  L)w = 
h(H0)
h
D + eD(1  )  qHi (6)

k(H0)(1  K)r = 
h(H0) eD  qH 1 (7)
The Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions are:

k(H) = 1
1 + 

k(H0)[1  k + (1  K)rs] (8)

h(H) = 1
1+
(
k(H0)(1-L)w[n`+(1-n)b]+
h(H0)f1+n(1-`)[D+ eD(1-)  qH ]g) (9)

n(H) = m+ 1
1+
f
k(H0)(1-L)wh(`-b)+
h(H0)(1-`)h[D+ eD(1-)  qH ]+
n(H0)(1- -)g(10)
From (6) and (7), we can solve the nonmarket e¤ective capital-labor ratio qH as a function of the
after-tax wage-rental ratio alone:
D + eD(1  )  qHeD (qH) 1 = (1  L)w(1  K)r (11)
This positive relationship may be thought of as the relative factor supply schedule.
2.2 Firms
The economy is populated by a continuum of large rms of mass one, each creating and maintaining
multiple job vacancies. A representative rm produces a single nal good yt by renting capital kt
from households and employing labor of mass nt under a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas
technology,
yt = A (stkt)
 (nt`tht)
1  (12)
5We note that the second-order conditions for the households and rms optimization as well as for the bargaining
between a household and a rm are rather complex. Thus, while we will check the second-order conditions numerically,
we do not report the analytic expressions.
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where A > 0 and  2 (0; 1).
Denoting t as the (endogenous) recruitment rate and vt as (endogenous) vacancies created, we
can specify the level of employment from the rms perspective as follows:
nt+1 = (1   )nt + tvt (13)
where the change in employment is equal to the inow of employees (tvt) net of the outow ( nt).
To be consistent with a balanced growth equilibrium, we assume that the unit cost of creating
and maintaining a vacancy is proportional to the average rm output yt. This setup is natural 
the more production the economy has, the more rms will compete for resources and the greater
the vacancy creation cost will be. Moreover, it is parsimonious the optimization is simple because
yt is regarded as given to each individual rm. Furthermore, it is neutral  the base in which
vacancy costs grow is not biased toward one of the two production factor inputs. Thus, the resource
cost for vacancy creation and maintenance is given by (vt) = ytvt, where  > 0. The level of
employment is the only state variable in the representative rms optimization problem. Each unit
of employment is augmented by the multiple of work e¤ort and human capital, xt = `tht. In this
endogenous growth framework, both capital stocks grow unboundedly. To ensure the stationarity
of the optimization problem (i.e., bounded rm value), we therefore deate the rms ow prot
t = A(stkt)
(ntxt)
1  wtntxt rtstkt ytvt by xt, where xt measures the e¤ective productivity
of the state variable, nt, and is taken as given by the representative rm. The associated Bellman
equation can then be written as:
 (nt) = max
vt; kt

A(stkt)
(ntxt)
1    wtntxt   rtstkt   ytvt
	
=xt +
1
1 + rt
 (nt+1) (14)
subject to constraint (13).
The rst-order conditions with respect to vt and kt and the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition
are derived as follows:

1 + r
 n
 
n0

= A
 
qF

n (15)
A
 
qF
 1
= r (16)
 n(n) = (1  )A
 
qF
   w + 1   
1 + r
 n
 
n0

(17)
From (16), we can derive the market e¤ective capital-labor ratio qF as a function of the capital
rental rate alone:
qF =

A
r
 1
1 
(18)
which is downward-sloping as expected.
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2.3 Labor Matching and Bargaining
While the capital market is assumed to be perfect, the labor market exhibits search frictions.
Following Diamond (1982), we assume pair-wise random matching in which the matching technology
takes the following constant-returns form:
Mt = B(1  nt) (vt)1  (19)
where B > 0 measures the degree of matching e¢ cacy and  2 (0; 1).
In our model economy, the households surplus accrued from a successful match is measured by
its incremental value of supplying an additional worker (
n) whereas the rms surplus is measured
by its incremental value of hiring an additional employee ( n). The representative household and the
representative rm determine the e¤ective wage rate through cooperative bargaining to maximize
their joint surplus:
max
wt
(
nt)
( nt)
1 
where  2 (0; 1) denotes the bargaining share to the household. In solving this wage bargaining
problem, the household-rm pair treats matching rates (t and t), the beginning-of-period level of
employment (nt), and the market rental rate (rt) as given. With e¢ ciency bargaining, the Hosios
(1990) rule holds in that  = . That is, the bargaining share is pinned down by the respective
matching elasticity. The rst-order condition of the bargaining problem is derived below:

wt

wt

nt
d
nt
dwt

=
1  
wt

  wt
 nt
d nt
dwt

(20)
2.4 The Government
The governments objective is to maximize the social welfare under a balanced budget. Its budget
constraint is given by,
Tt + wtht(1  nt)b = Lwtht

nt`t + (1  nt)b

+ Krtstkt (21)
That is, the government receives wage and capital income taxes to spend on direct transfers to
households and unemployment compensation. Of particular note is that the inclusion of transfers
is to ensure that the governments budget is balanced in the presence of pre-existing factor taxes
and unemployment compensation that ts the data observations.
With a frictional labor market and cooperative bargaining, rms will have none zero ow prot.
A direct and convenient measure of social welfare is the balanced-growth augmented household
value,denoted by , in which the household consumption is augmented by the ow prot redistri-
bution (i.e., c+ ).6 Thus, the dynamic tax incidence problem is to maximize the balanced-growth
6We will return to a full specication of this augmented household value after solving the steady-state equilibrium.
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augmented household value subject to all the policy functions obtained from the households and
the rms optimization problems, the bargaining problem, and the governments budget constraint
(21).7
3 Equilibrium
A dynamic search equilibrium is a tuple of individual quantity variables, fct; `t; vt; kt; ht; nt; yt,
qtg1t=0, a pair of aggregate quantities fMt; Ttg1t=0, a pair of matching rates ft; tg1t=0, and a pair
of prices, fwt; rtg1t=0, such that: (i) all households and rms optimize; (ii) human capital and
employment evolution hold, (iii) labor-market matching and wage bargaining conditions are met;
(iv) the government budget is balanced; and (v) the goods market clears. A balanced growth path
(BGP) is a dynamic search equilibrium along which consumption, physical and human capital, and
output all grow at positive constant rates. In our model, both the market goods and the human
capital investment production technologies are homogeneous of degree one in reproducible factors
(k and h). Thus, all endogenously growing quantities (c, k, h and y) must grow at a common
rate, g, on a BGP, whereas employment (n), vacancies (v) and equilibrium matches (M) must
all be stationary. Given the common growth property, we can divide all the perpetually growing
variables by h to obtain stationary ratios, kh ,
c
h , and
y
h , where the latter two ratios measure e¤ective
consumption and e¤ective output, respectively.
Along a BGP, the labor market must satisfy the steady-state matching (Beveridge curve) rela-
tionships given by,
 n = (1  n) = v = B(1  n) (v)1  (22)
An additional condition to the previously dened employment evolution and labor-market matching
equations, (1), (13) and (19), is to require the equilibrium employment inows from the household
side ((1   n)) to be equal to those from the rm side (v). The above relationships enable us to
solve both matching rates and equilibrium vacancies as functions of n alone:
(n) =
 n
1  n (23)
7 It should be noted that the government cannot coordinate labor-market matches (i.e., regard matching rates
f; g as given); however, it can determine the sharing rule based on e¢ cient bargaining. Thus, the government solves
a pseudo planners dynamic programming problem using the individuals lifetime utility with the resource constraint
replacing the household budget constraint, without wage bargaining, to determine optimal at tax rates (K ; 

L) by
evaluating the outcome at the BGP. Because our decentralized outcome satises the e¢ cient-bargain Hosios rule, it
is equivalent to solving the above problem as follows: given all individual policy functions, the resource constraint,
the government budget constraint and the matching rate functions f(n);  (n)g, the government maximizes  to
determine optimal at tax rates (K ; 

L).
10
(n) = B
1
1  (n)
 
1  (24)
v(n) = B
 1
1  (n)

1  n (25)
Thus, while the job nding rate and equilibrium vacancies are positively related to equilibrium
employment, the employee recruitment rate is negatively related to it. We can also derive the
labor-market tightness measure (from the rms point of view),  = v=(1  n), as:
(n) =

(n)
B
 1
1 
(26)
which is positively related to the job nding rate and hence equilibrium employment.
In order to generate a BGP equilibrium, we must impose a logarithmic utility function: U(c) =
ln c.8 Along a BGP,  n(n0) and 
n(H0) are constant whereas 
k(H0) and 
h(H0) are decreasing
at rate g. From (15), (16) and (17), we obtain an expression for employment that depends on the
market e¤ective capital-labor ratio as well as the recruitment rate and the wage rate:
n =

(r +  )

(1  )  w
rqF

(27)
Using (6), (8), and (9), we obtain:
g =
(1  K)rs  k   
1 + 
(28)
+ (1 + )g =
h
D + eD(1  )  qHi [n+ (1  n)b] (29)
The expression (28) is a generalized Keynes-Ramsey relationship governing consumption growth,
now depending on the market use of physical capital s. The expression (29) is an intertemporal
optimization condition governing human capital accumulation.
Moreover, we can apply the human capital evolution equation (2) to relate learning e¤ort to the
nonmarket e¤ective capital-labor ratio, employment and the balanced growth rate:
1  ` = g
n
h
D + eD (qH)i (30)
Further dene the unit wage income as Sw = (1   L)
h
1 + (1 n)
b
n`
i
and the unit rental income as
Sr =
h
(1  K)r   g+ks
i
. From (3) and the denition of qF , we can derive e¤ective consumption
along a BGP as:
c
h
=
 
Sww + Srq
F

n`+
T
h
(31)
where T is regarded as given by individuals with its equilibrium value being pinned down by the
government budget constraint (21).
8Suppose the utility function takes a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution form. It can be easily veried
that, should this elasticity be di¤erent from one, (10) would violate the BGP requirements.
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To solve the wage bargaining problem, we rst note that the household-rm pair in the bargaining
game must take f; ; n; rg as given. From (18), qF must also be regarded as predetermined. Using
(11) and (29), we can express both the nonmarket e¤ective capital-labor ratio and the balanced
growth rate as increasing functions of the bargained wage alone: qH = qH(w) and g = g(w).
Intuitively, while it is clear that a higher wage and hence a higher wage-rental ratio (given r) leads
to a higher non-market e¤ective capital-output ratio, the latter in turn raises the BGP human
capital accumulation rate. Combining (29) and (30) yields `(w) as follows:
`(w) = 1  (1  )g(w)
n

(1 + ) g(w) + 
n+ (1  n)b   D
 1
(32)
The bargained wage serves as an incentive to encourage households, on the one hand, to devote
more e¤ort to market activity, while, on the other hand, accumulating more human capital. When
the long-run human capital accumulation e¤ect dominates (as it will in the calibrated economy), it
is expected that an increase in the bargained wage will reduce work e¤ort. By the denitions of qF
and qH , we have:
qF
qH(w)
=
s
1  s
1  `(w)
`(w)
which can then be used to derive s = s(w) as a decreasing function of the bargained wage. Intuitively,
a higher bargained wage raises the learning e¤ort (1   `) and, by capital-labor complementarity,
results in a larger fraction of capital being devoted to human capital accumulation (i.e., a higher
1  s).
Endowed with the functions qH(w), g(w), `(w) and s(w) given above, we are now ready to
determine the equilibrium wage. From (8), (9) and (10), we can write the households surplus
accrued from a successful match as follows:

n =
1 + 
+  + 

(1  L)(1  b) w
c=h
+m

(33)
where from (31) ch is increasing in w but less than proportionally, implying that the households
surplus is increasing in w.
It is informative to compute the wage discount that measures how much the bargained wage is
below its competitive counterpart (i.e., the marginal product of labor, MPL):
  MPL  w
MPL
= 1  w
(1  )A (qF ) (34)
Straightforward di¤erentiation of the surplus accrued by each party leads to   w n d ndw = 1  and
w

n
d
n
dw =
SrqF+T=(n`h)
Sww+SrqF+T=(n`h)
. While the former is decreasing in the wage discount  and hence
increasing in w, the latter is decreasing in w. Thus, we can rewrite (20) as:
MBw =

w +m (Sww+Srq
F )n`+T=h
(1 L)(1 b)
Srq
Fn`+ Th
(Sww + SrqF )n`+
T
h
=
1  
(1  )A (qF )   w =MCw (35)
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where the marginal benet from the households point of view (MBw) is decreasing in w and the
marginal cost from the rms point of view (MCw) is increasing in w (see the top panel of Figure
2).9 We can also plot the relationship between the wage discount and the wage rate, which is
downward-sloping based on the expression in (34) above (see the bottom panel of Figure 2). Once
the bargained wage is determined (see w0 in Figure 2), we can then solve the associated wage
discount (see  in Figure 2).
Most notably, using (24), (25), (28) and (35) to eliminate qF , , v, r, and w, we can then
express (27) as a relationship in (n; g). This relationship summarizes a rms e¢ ciency conditions
that govern capital demand, labor demand and vacancy creation, with steady-state matching and
bargained wage conditions embedded, which will be referred to as the equilibrium rm e¢ ciency
(FE) relationship. Similarly, we can apply the bargained wage to eliminate qH(w) from (29) to
obtain another balanced growth relationship in (n; g), which will be referred to as the optimized
human capital accumulation (HA) relationship. Due to its complexity, we will defer any further
discussion until the numerical section.
We are now prepared to characterize the e¤ects of factor taxes on bargained wages, given
f; ; n; rg and hence the e¤ective capital-labor ratio qF (refer to (18)). An increase in K has
a direct negative e¤ect on the unit rental income (Sr), which decreases the households marginal
benet and leads to a downward shift in the MBw locus. On the contrary, there are two direct
e¤ects of higher labor taxation L: one is to reduce Sw and thus shift theMBw locus up and another
is to suppress MBw via the extensive margin of leisure. However, there are many indirect general
equilibrium e¤ects via the physical capital allocation share (s), work e¤ort (`) and the endogenous
growth rate (g). The net e¤ects of factor taxes on the MBw locus are thus generally ambiguous.
Since qF is taken as given, it is clear that the MCw locus will not respond to changes in factor
tax rates. In the top panel of Figure 2, we depict the bargained outcomes based on the calibrated
benchmark economy where both tax policies shift the MBw locus downward, thereby decreasing
the workersoption value and lowering their pre-tax wages. Due to a positive direct e¤ect via Sw, it
is not surprising that the resultant decrease in wages is smaller in response to an increase in labor
compared to capital taxation. Such a di¤erence is nonetheless smaller if the direct e¤ect of labor
taxation via leisure is stronger (e.g., when m is larger).
After solving the bargaining game, we then plot the wage discount-wage relationship (34) in
the (w;) space in the bottom panel of Figure 2 (where qF and n are allowed to change). Notice
9The bargained wage rate and the equilibrium wage can be derived by solving the following quadratic equation:
Sw(1-)F1w
2 + fSrq[(1-)F1+]-SwF2(1-)gw   Srq[(1-)F2 + (1-)Aq] = 0
where F1 =
(1 L)(1 b)+mn`Sw
(1 L)(1 b) > 0 and F2 =
 m(Srqn`+T=h)
(1 L)(1 b) < 0.
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that this wage discount schedule only depends on the market e¤ective capital-labor ratio qF . By
raising the pre-tax real rental rate and hence reducing qF , an increase in K shifts the wage discount
schedule down; on the contrary, an increase in L raises qF and shifts the wage discount schedule
up. In the case of labor taxation, it is expected that the bargained wage and the wage discount
are negatively related as long as the direct e¤ect dominates (which is the case in our calibrated
economy). Thus, a higher labor tax is anticipated, leading to a lower wage discount. In the case
of capital taxation, even if it has a negative e¤ect on the bargained wage, its e¤ect on the wage
discount remains ambiguous. For illustrative purposes, the shifts depicted in the bottom panel of
Figure 2 are based on the calibrated outcome (in which the wage discount is lower in response to
a higher capital tax, but such a reduction is smaller than that in response to a higher labor tax in
elasticities). We will thus relegate a complete characterization to the calibration section to which
we now turn.
4 Numerical Analysis
We now turn to calibrating our benchmark model. We then conduct comparative-static exercises
quantitatively, particularly focusing on the balanced growth e¤ects of the two factor tax rates. We
then perform tax incidence exercises and derive the optimal factor tax mix numerically. Finally, we
perform sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness of our numerical results.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate parameter values to match the U.S. quarterly data during the post-WWII period. We
set the quarterly per capita real GDP growth rate to g = 0:45% and the quarterly depreciation rate
of capital to 0:01 to match the annual per capita real GDP growth rate of 1:8% and the annual
depreciation rate of capital in the range of 3   8%, respectively. With an annual time preference
rate of 5%, we set our quarterly rate of time preference to 0:0125. The output elasticity of capital
is set at the conventional value  = 0:36. The capital rental rate can then be calibrated by using
the observed capital-output ratio k=y = 10:64: r = k=y = 0:0338. It is immediately known from
(28) that s = 0:999578. Thus, in this calibrated economy, almost all of the physical capital inputs
are used for goods production. As argued by Kendrick (1976), human capital is as large as physical
capital. We thus set the physical to human capital ratio at k=h = 1.
Based on the observation and the factor tax incidence exercises conducted by Judd (1985)
and many others, we set the pre-existing at tax rates: K = 0:2 and L = 0:2. The ratio of
unemployment compensation to the market wage (b) is set to 0:42, in line with Shimer (2005)
and Hall (2005). Also based on Shimer (2005), the monthly separation rate is given as 0:034 and
the monthly job nding rate as 0:45. These enable us to compute the quarterly separation rate
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 = 1  (1  0:034)3 = 0:0986 and the quarterly job nding rate  = 1  (1  0:45)3 = 0:834. From
(22), we can compute: n = + = 0:894. By following Shimer (2005) to normalize the vacancy-
searching worker ratio ( vu) as one, we can utilize (22) and (23) to calibrate  = B = 0:834 and use
(25) to obtain v =  n = 0:106.
Next, we choose a reasonable value of equilibrium work e¤ort ` = 0:725 (i.e., 72:5% of household
time is allocated to market work). Given the k=h ratio and the values of n, ` and s, the market and
nonmarket e¤ective capital-labor ratios are computed as: qF  sk
n`h
= 1:542 and qH  (1  s) k
n (1  `)h =
0:00172. The former can then be plugged into (18) to compute: A = 0:124. Since human capital
investment is expected to be more human capital-intensive than goods production (i.e.,  <  =
0:36), we set  = 0:3. We can then apply (29) and (30) to calibrate the two human capital
accumulation scaling parameters: D = 0:0179 and eD = 0:00290. These can be substituted into (11)
to obtain: w = 0:00825. This can further be plugged into (27) to yield  = 4:1052 and into (34) to
compute  = 0:911.
Moreover, we follow Andolfatto (1995), setting  = 0:5. In Andolfatto, the ow utility gain
from leisure per employed is about twice as much as the comparable gure for the unemployed (the
marginal valuation of leisure by the employed is higher). In addition, we conduct a quick accounting
of the time use of the employed (40 hours work time per week for 50 weeks, the corresponding
learning time consistent with our calibration, and the remaining time for leisure inclusive of a
2-week vacation), implying that the percentages of time for work, learning and leisure are 23%,
9% and 68%, respectively. We then calibrate m1, m2 and z to match the time allocation of the
employed described above and to meet two additional targets based on Andolfatto: the ratio of
the relative marginal utility of leisure of the employed to the unemployed (about 1:5) and the ratio
of the level of the individual utility of leisure of the employed to the unemployed (about 2). This
yields: m1 = 0:038, m2 = 0:025 and z = 3:0, which imply that m =  m2(1+ z) 1+m1z 1 = 0:064
and  = 0:1124. Thus, by assuming bargaining to be e¢ cient, our calibrated worker elasticity of
matching is on the low side compared to the estimate obtained by Blanchard and Diamond (1990).
Finally, we can compute ch = 0:0247 and
T
h = 0:00754 based on (31) and (21), respectively.
We summarize the observables, benchmark parameter values and calibrated values of key en-
dogenous variables in Table 1.
4.2 Numerical Results
We next simulate the benchmark model to quantitatively examine the e¤ects of two factor tax rates
(K and L) on an array of endogenous variables of interest, including the balanced growth rate
(g), e¤ective consumption (c=h), the physical-human capital ratio (k=h), e¤ective output (y=h),
employment (n), work e¤ort (`); the wage (w), the wage discount (), the workersjob nding rate
(), the rmsemployee recruitment rate (), and rmsvacancies (v). The results obtained based
15
on the responses of these endogenous variables around the balanced growth equilibrium to a 10%
increase in each of the factor tax rates are reported in Table 2A.
In our calibrated economy, we can now quantify the e¤ects of the two factor tax rates (K and
L) on the bargained wage and the wage discount in our calibrated economy. A higher capital tax
is found to lower the bargained wage and the wage discount slightly, whereas a higher labor tax
reduces the wage rate but raises the wage discount. While capital taxation discourages vacancy
creation and generates a negative e¤ect on employment, labor taxation leads to opposite outcomes.
Thus, the former lowers the workers job nding rate but increases the rms recruitment rate, while
the latter generates opposite e¤ects on these ow matching rates. Either tax suppresses learning
e¤ort and the balanced growth rate, as well as the after-tax capital rental rate and the after-tax
e¤ective wage rate. Since factor taxation has a stronger negative e¤ect on the tax factor, the
physical-human capital ratio falls in response to higher capital taxation, but rises in response to
higher labor taxation. Our numerical results also suggest that a higher capital tax rate reduces
output more than proportionately than human capital, but consumption less than proportionately,
whereas labor taxation yields exactly the opposite results along the calibrated BGP.
To gain better insights, we plot in the (n; g) space the HA and FE loci based on the calibrated
benchmark economy. As depicted in the top panel of Figure 3, both loci are upward-sloping.
Intuitively, given the optimized human capital accumulation relationship, an increase in equilibrium
employment enlarges the base of learners and hence promotes higher growth, implying an upward-
sloping HA locus. The slope of the equilibrium rm e¢ ciency relationship is in general ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the direct e¤ect of a higher level of equilibrium employment is to reduce the e¤ective
capital-labor ratio. By diminishing the marginal product, the marginal product of capital must rise,
as will the capital rental rate. From the Keynes-Ramsey equation, a higher rate of balanced growth
is implied. In the calibrated economy, our numerical results suggest that the direct e¤ect dominates
other indirect e¤ects. We thus obtain an upward-sloping FE locus. Moreover, we can also see
from (35) that as an increase in equilibrium employment lowers the e¤ective capital-labor ratio,
the households marginal benet decreases, whereas the rms marginal cost increases. Thus, the
equilibrium wage falls while the equilibrium wage discount rises. This positive relationship between
employment and the wage discount is referred to as the wage bargain (WB) locus, and is depicted
in the bottom panel of Figure 3.
We turn next to examining the growth e¤ects of the factor taxes based on the calibrated bench-
mark economy, as depicted in the top panel of Figure 3. In response to an increase in the capital
or labor tax rate, the HA locus shifts down. Since higher labor taxation encourages a shift from
market to nonmarket activity, its e¤ect on optimized human capital accumulation is not as large
as that of capital taxation. Moreover, either tax increase reduces rm e¢ ciency: for a given BGP
market employment, the economic growth rate must be lower, implying a downward shift in the
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FE locus. In equilibrium, our numerical results suggest that labor taxation induces a larger shift
in human capital-based growth and hence the rm FE locus. This causes employment to rise and
growth to decline in response to a higher labor tax. By contrast, in response to a higher capital
tax, both employment and growth decline.
4.3 Factor Tax Incidence
We are now prepared to conduct tax incidence analysis in our endogenously growing economy. In
particular, we change the composition of the two factor tax rates by keeping the government revenue
unchanged. Under the pre-existing rates (K ; L) = (20%; 20%), the e¤ective lump-sum tax is
computed as (T=h) = 0:00754. This benchmark value will be kept constant and the government
budget constraint (21) will remain balanced in our revenue-neutral tax-incidence exercises.
We next compute the social welfare measure along the BGP. Setting h0 = 1, we can calculate
the lifetime utility as follows:

 =
1 + 


ln(
c
h
) m (1  n) + 1

ln(1 + g)

(36)
where e¤ective consumption is given by (31) with T=h = (T=h). This is not a correct welfare
measure, because there are ow prots that have accrued from bargaining in the presence of labor-
market frictions. As discussed in the previous section, we can redistribute the ow prots to
households to obtain a true welfare measure. From the denition of  and (16), the ow prot
redistribution to each household in e¤ective units is specied as:

h
= n`
h
(1  )A  qF    wi (37)
Thus, the households (redistribution) augmented e¤ective consumption becomes:
c+ 
h
=
h
(1  )A  qF  + SrqF   (1  Sw)win`+ (T
h
) (38)
This value can be used to replace pre-redistribution e¤ective consumption in (36) to compute aug-
mented household value,


c+ 
h
; g

=
1 + 


ln(
c+ 
h
) m (1  n) + 1

ln(1 + g)

(39)
which is our social welfare measure. In short, social welfare is mainly driven by two endogenous
variables: the economy-wide balanced growth rate and augmented e¤ective consumption.
Figure 4 plots the dynamic factor tax incidence results. From Table 2, a higher capital tax
than the pre-existing rate raises e¤ective consumption, whereas a higher labor tax reduces it. Thus,
the e¤ect of a shift from labor to capital taxation on e¤ective consumption turns out to be hump-
shaped, peaking at around K = 22%. A similar result holds for augmented e¤ective consumption.
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Both taxes generate detrimental growth e¤ects. When the capital tax rate is within 5 percentage
points of its pre-existing rate, a shift from labor to capital taxation reduces economic growth locally,
although the magnitude of such e¤ects is modest. Moreover, this growth e¤ect is partly o¤set by the
endogenous leisure e¤ect. As a result, the lifetime utility of a household is hump-shaped, peaking
around K = 19:5%. By adjusting e¤ective consumption and lifetime utility based on ow prot
redistribution and combining these two e¤ects (on augmented e¤ective consumption and economic
growth), the welfare measure is hump-shaped as well, peaking at a slightly lower capital tax rate of
around K = 19%. Specically, the welfare measure is maximized at (K ; 

L) = (19:07%; 24:56%).
That is, in the absence of other tax alternatives, the socially optimal factor tax mix requires a
mild decrease in the capital tax rate in conjunction with a modest increase in the labor tax rate
from their benchmark values. Such a tax reform will lead to a 0:18% increase in economic growth
and a small 0:0044% increase in welfare (0:013% in consumption equivalence), because the optimal
tax mix is not too far from the pre-existing gure. Our nding that the optimal capital tax rate
is signicantly larger than zero is in sharp contrast to the dynamic factor tax incidence literature
within both the exogenous and endogenous growth frameworks.
It is important to understand the numerically dominant channel underlying this shocking nding:
the vacancy creation-labor participation channel. Specically, under an e¢ ciency wage bargain, if
the capital tax rate is initially too low, then a higher tax on capital income accompanied by a
revenue-neutral reduction in the labor tax turns out to raise the wage discount and to encourage
rms to create more vacancies. This in turn raises the job nding rate and hence induces workers
to more actively participate in the labor market to seek employment. Because this leads to positive
e¤ects on employment and output growth, a shift from a zero to a positive capital tax rate becomes
welfare-improving, thereby yielding a policy recommendation di¤erent from that of Chamley-Judd-
Lucas.10
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
While our pre-set parameters in the calibration exercises are all basically justied, some of the
calibration criteria may be argued to be open to discussion. We therefore perform sensitivity
analysis to check the robustness of our results. In particular, we consider the following alternatives:
(i) We allow the labor-market tightness,  = v=(1  n), to fall in a wide range [0:5; 2].
(ii) We allow the leisure preference parameter, m, to be 50% below and above its benchmark value.
10 It should be noted that the wage discount e¤ect is dominant, leading to a strong vacancy creation-labor partic-
ipation e¤ect around K = 0, but is not strong enough around the pre-existing tax rates. That is, the optimal tax
mix still features an optimal capital tax lower than the pre-existing rate of 20%.
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(iii) We allow the ratio of the unemployment compensation to the market wage, b, to be 5 percent-
age points below and above its benchmark value.
(iv) We allow the capital share of human capital accumulation, , to be 5% below and above its
benchmark value.
(v) We allow the amount of physical capital to be half or twice as large as the amount of human
capital, i.e., k=h = 0:5; 2.
The sensitivity analysis results are reported in Table 3.
When we recalibrate the model with di¤erent labor-market tightness measures, di¤erent capi-
tal shares of human capital accumulation, or di¤erent physical-human capital ratios, labor-market
matching, bargaining and human capital accumulation are either unchanged or changed only neg-
ligibly. Thus, the wage discount e¤ect and the vacancy creation-labor participation channel are
essentially identical to those in the benchmark case, thereby leaving the factor tax incidence result
largely una¤ected.
When the leisure preference parameter is 50% above its benchmark value, the direct e¤ect
of labor taxation on leisure is so strong that the detrimental e¤ect of a higher labor tax on the
marginal benet of the household in a wage bargain is larger than that of a higher capital tax.
Due to its greater distortion on the wage discount, labor taxation is more harmful to welfare.
The optimal tax mix in this case turns out to feature a shift from labor to capital taxation:
(K ; 

L) = (20:46%; 17:76%). On the contrary, when the leisure preference parameter is 50%
below its benchmark value, the optimal tax mix becomes: (K ; 

L) = (16:80%; 35:62%), which still
features a large positive tax on capital income.
When the unemployment compensation-market wage ratio is 5 percentage points higher (i.e.,
b = 0:42 + 0:05), it is required that the government raise both tax rates in order to maintain a
balanced budget. Relatively speaking, however, the overall distortion of L increases as a result
of the reduced incentive for working or accumulating human capital. Therefore, the optimal tax
mix becomes: (K ; 

L) = (20:78%; 13:56%), which features a shift from labor to capital taxation.
Conversely, when the unemployment compensation-market wage ratio is 5 percentage points lower
(b = 0:42 0:05), the optimal tax mix features a complete elimination of the capital tax: (K ; L) =
(0%; 37:68%). That is, when the households incentive for working or accumulating human capital
is su¢ ciently strong, the overall distortion of labor taxation becomes insignicant. It is therefore
welfare-improving to fully replace the more distortionary capital tax by the labor tax.
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5 Alternative Setups
In this section, we consider three alternative setups, labeled as Models I-III, that may potentially
favor a higher tax imposed on labor income. The rst two are on the household side while keeping
the rms optimization problem unchanged, whereas the last is a Walrasian model where there is
no labor market friction. Table 4 summarizes the main tax incidence results.
5.1 Model I: Inelastic Leisure
In the benchmark model with endogenous labor-leisure choice, labor-related decisions become more
elastic, implying that the tax on labor income is more distortionary than the case with inelastic
leisure. While this labor participation response is tied to the extensive margin of leisure, just how
important such a channel is to the optimal tax mix outcome is a quantitative matter.
With inelastic leisure, we take m = 0 and recalibrate  = 0:0823. By performing tax incidence
analysis (see the results reported in Row 1, Table 4), we nd that the optimal tax mix (K ; 

L) is
now at (9:15%; 68:79%), featuring a sizable shift from capital to labor taxation. This suggests that
with inelastic leisure, taxing labor becomes quantitatively much less harmful. In this case, a tax
reform will lead to a nonnegligible welfare gain of 0:60% (in consumption equivalence).
5.2 Model II: Linear Human Capital Accumulation Function
In the benchmark case, we assume that human capital and physical capital are both required for
human capital accumulation. Now we consider an alternative setup of human capital formation
where only human capital is used as an input (the Lucasian human capital formation). One can
think of this as a special case of (2) with eD = 0 and s = 1. That is,
ht+1   ht = Dnt(1  `t)ht
The modied optimization and BGP conditions are presented in the Appendix. Recall that
human capital production is tax-exempt. When market goods (physical capital) are no longer
inputs to human capital accumulation, the entirety of physical capital must be subject to taxation.
As a consequence, the overall distortion of K rises and the optimal tax mix now features a larger
shift from capital to labor taxation: (K ; 

L) = (17:87%; 30:70%), which generates a larger welfare
gain of 0:072% (in consumption equivalence), compared to the benchmark case. Our results imply
that optimal taxation is not too sensitive to the form of human capital accumulation.
5.3 Model III: Walrasian Economy
To highlight the role played by labor-market frictions, we investigate the tax incidence outcome in
a frictionless Walrasian economy with full employment. By construction, n = 1 and hence there
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is no extensive margin of leisure. The modied optimization and BGP conditions are presented in
the Appendix. By comparing it with the optimal tax mix result in our benchmark case, the role
of labor-market frictions can be identied. Specically, we nd that the optimal tax mix becomes:
(K ; 

L) = (0%; 27:51%), which restores the Lucasian policy recommendation the optimal tax mix
in the Lucas (1990) case is (K ; 

L) = (0%; 46%) based on higher pre-existing tax rates (K ; L) =
(40%; 36%). Thus, even in a human capital-based endogenous growth model, one should replace
capital taxation fully by labor taxation if the labor market is frictionless. This veries our intuition:
it is the labor-market frictions that lead to a di¤erent dynamic factor tax incidence conclusion from
previous studies.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a human capital-based endogenous growth framework with labor
market search and entry frictions that permit individuals to participate in the labor force voluntarily.
By conducting dynamic factor tax incidence exercises, we have found that it is never optimal to
set the capital tax rate to zero when both physical and human capital are used as inputs of human
capital accumulation. We have shown that, in the benchmark case with physical capital entering
the human capital accumulation process and with a pre-existing at rate of 20% on both capital
and labor income, a partial shift from capital to labor taxation maximizes social welfare  this
main nding is robust to di¤erent parameterization as well as to alternative setups with inelastic
leisure or with a Lucasian human capital accumulation process that is independent of market goods
(physical capital). Our results suggest that, in order to enhance social welfare, a proper tax reform
must take into account labor market frictions. When such frictions are substantial, fully replacing
capital with labor income taxation can be welfare-retarding.
For future research along these lines, it is perhaps most interesting to incorporate a pecuniary
vacancy creation cost that requires capital nancing. In the presence of credit market frictions as a
result of private information, such a nancing constraint is anticipated to increase the capital tax
distortion. On the contrary, one may also extend the model to allow the separation rate to depend
on on-the-job learning e¤ort (as in Mortensen 1988). Since the labor income tax discourages on-
the-job learning, it is anticipated that such a generalization may cause the labor tax to be more
distortionary. Thus, both extensions call for a revisit of dynamic factor tax incidence exercises:
while the former may favor a shift from taxing capital to taxing labor income, the latter may yield
opposite policy outcomes.
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Appendix
(Not Intended for Publication)
In the Appendix, we provide mathematical details of the Alternative Models II (linear human
capital accumulation) and III (Walrasian).
Alternative Model II: Linear Human Capital Accumulation
In the case with a linear human capital accumulation process independent of market goods, the
rst-order condition of the households optimization problem (5) is the same while (6) becomes:

k(H0)(1  L)w = 
h(H0)D (A1)
The Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions of the households optimization problem are now:

k(H) = 1
1 + 

k(H0)[(1  k) + (1  K)r] (A2)

h(H) = 1
1 + 


k(H0)(1  L)w[n`+ (1  n)b] + 
h(H0)[1 +Dn(1  `)]
	
(A3)

n(H) = m+ 1
1 + 


k(H0)
 
`  b (1  L)wh+
h(H0)D(1  `)h+
n(H0)(1     ) (A4)
The BGP equilibrium expressions follow by simply setting eD = 0 and s = 1.
Alternative Model III: Walrasian Model
We consider a Walrasian economy with n = 1. Let qHt =
(1  st)kt
(1  `t)ht and q
F
t =
stkt
`tht
. Then the
rms optimal decisions are:
A
 
qFt
 1
= rt (A5)
(1  )A  qFt  = wt (A6)
Combining (A5) and (A6), we have:
qFt =
wt
(1  )rt (A7)
The household faces the following budget constraint:
kt+1 = (1  L)wt`tht + [(1  k + (1  K)rt]kt   ct + Tt (A8)
The main change is the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition with respect to h:

h(H) = 1
1+
n

k(H0)(1-L)w`+
h(H0)
h
1+(1-`)
h
D+ eD(1-)  qHiio (A9)
By imposing a log utility function U(c) = ln c, we can derive the following equations along the BGP:
+ (1 + )g =
h
D + eD(1  )  qHi (A10)
` = 1  g
D + eD (qH) (A11)
The generalized Keynes-Ramsey relationship (28) and (11) remain unchanged. The e¤ective con-
sumption along a BGP is:
c
h
= (1  L)w`+

(1  K)r   g + k
s

qF `+
T
h
(A12)
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values and Calibration  
Benchmark Parameters and Observables   
per capita real economic growth rate g 0.0045 
physical capital’s depreciation rate δk 0.0100 
time preference rate ρ 0.0125 
tax rate on capital τK 0.2000 
tax rate on income τL 0.2000 
unemployment insurance b  0.4200 
capital’s share α 0.3600 
capital-output ratio k/y 10.6400 
physical capital-human capital ratio k/h 1.0000 
fraction of  time devoted to work l 0.7250 
job separating rate ψ 0.0986 
job finding rate  μ 0.8336 
vacancy-searching worker ratio v/u 1.0000 
parameter of  human capital accumulation γ 0.3000 
preference parameter of  leisure ε  0.5000 
Calibration   
coefficient of  goods technology A 0.1240 
coefficient of  matching technology B 0.8336 
consumption-human capital ratio c/h 0.0247 
transfer-human capital ratio T/h 0.0075 
fraction of  physical capital devoted to goods production s 0.9996 
effective capital-labor ratio in the nonmarket sector Hq  0.0017 
effective capital-labor ratio in the market sector Fq  1.5418 
coefficient of  the cost of  vacancy creation and management φ  4.1052 
coefficient of  human capital accumulation D 0.0179 
coefficient of  human capital accumulation D~   0.0029 
rate of  return of  capital r 0.0338 
fraction of  time devoted to employment  n 0.8943 
preference parameter of  leisure m 0.0640 
labor searcher’s share in matching production β 0.1124 
vacancy creation  v 0.1057 
employee recruitment rate η 0.8336 
wage w 0.0082 
wage discount Δ 0.9111  
 
 
Table 2: Numerical Results (τK=20%, τL=20%) 
 Benchmark τK  increases τL increases 
g 
c/h 
k/h 
y/h 
s 
n  
1-n 
l  
(1-l)n 
Hq  
Fq  
r 
(1-τK)r 
w 
(1-τL)w 
Δ 
μ 
η 
ν 
0.004500 
0.024667 
1.000000 
0.093945 
0.999578 
0.894259 
0.105741 
0.725000 
0.245921 
0.001715 
1.541755 
0.033835 
0.027068 
0.008247 
0.006597 
0.911074 
0.833625 
0.833625 
0.105741 
-0.065257 
0.005524 
-0.403199 
-0.156321 
-0.000085 
-0.030281 
0.254314 
0.012883 
-0.064285 
-0.139229 
-0.385887 
0.246972 
-0.010890 
-0.109036 
-0.109036 
-0.002920 
-0.284594 
0.036033 
-0.066314 
-0.004813 
-0.001997 
0.003816 
0.003006 
0.000169 
0.001221 
-0.010330 
0.001234 
-0.002032 
-0.399016 
0.001531 
-0.000980 
-0.000980 
-0.024395 
-0.282256 
0.002433 
     0.011551 
-0.001462 
0.002684 
Note:  Numbers reported in columns 2~3 are elasticities of  key variables with respect to each 
exogenous shift in tax rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
 τK *   τL * (g *-g)/g  (Λ*-Λ)/Λ Welfare gain in 
consumption equivalence
Benchmark 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0044 0.0128 
θ= 0.5 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0044 0.0128 
θ= 2 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0044 0.0128 
m = 0.064*0.5 16.80 35.62 0.5491 0.0414 0.1201 
   (0.0512)      
m = 0.064*1.5 
   (0.0768) 
20.46 17.76 -0.0951 0.0012 0.0035 
b = 0.37 0.00 37.68 0.4020 1.8501 4.8201 
b = 0.47 20.78 13.56 0.0384 0.0056 0.0164 
γ = 0.3*0.95 
(0.285) 
19.07 24.56 0.1812 0.0044 0.0127 
γ = 0.3*1.05 
(0.315) 
19.07 24.56 0.1864 0.0044 0.0128 
k/h = 0.5 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0036 0.0128 
k/h = 2 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0058 0.0128 
Note:   Numbers reported are in percentage. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Tax Incidence Analysis under Various Setups 
 τK *   τL * (g *-g)/g  (Λ*-Λ)/Λ Welfare gain in 
consumption equivalence
Benchmark 19.07 24.56 0.1839 0.0044 0.0128 
I. Inelastic leisure 9.15 68.79 0.7757 0.2064 0.5991 
II. Linear HCA 17.87 30.70 0.5995 0.0249 0.0724 
III. Walrasian 0.00 27.51 5.4285 4.5347 10.3581 
Note:   Numbers reported are in percentage. 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Labor Allocation of  the Day Time  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Effects of  Factor Taxes on Wage Bargaining: Higher Kτ  or Lτ  
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Figure 3:  Growth Effects of  Factor Taxes 
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Figure 4:  Dynamic Tax Incidence Results 
 
 
 
